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GENDER-NEUTRAL PRONOUNS: THEY ARE HERE TO STAY
Olivia Mendes*
I. INTRODUCTION
It was an uphill battle for Tamara Lusardi, a military veteran
working as a software engineer with the United States Army, after she
decided to come out as a transgender woman to her co-workers.1
Tamara’s employer prevented her from using the women’s bathroom
and her supervisor consistently and deliberately misgendered her—
called her by her former name and male pronouns—in disrespect of her
gender identity.2 In a 2015 interview, Tamara recounted how her
supervisor would intentionally misgender her: “We’d be in a meeting,
[and] he’d say ‘Todd, I need you to answer this.’”3 On camera, Tamara
imitated the way she remembers the supervisor would sarcastically
smirk after calling her by her former name.4 Tamara recalled that some
of her co-workers might query, “who’s Todd?” and the supervisor would
reply something to the effect of, “Oh, I meant Tamara, you know, he just
changed his name.”5
Tamara went on to file a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), asserting that she was subject to
hostile work environment sexual harassment because she was
“repeatedly referred to her by male pronouns.”6 Tamara was ultimately
successful; the EEOC held that the Army violated Title VII by cultivating
a hostile work environment when it allowed a supervisor to
* She/her/hers. J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A.,
University of Delaware. I would like to thank Professor Charles Sullivan for his
invaluable insight and guidance while writing this Comment. I am grateful to the
members and executive board of the Seton Hall Law Review for their support in
publishing this Comment, as well as the members of Seton Hall’s Lambda Law Alliance
who took the time to read my draft.
1 See generally Lusardi v. McHugh, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL
1607756 (Apr. 1, 2015).
2 Id. at *2–3.
3 American Federation of Government Employees, Tamara’s Tale: Transgender
Veteran Fights for Equal Rights at Work, YOUTUBE (June 24, 2015), https://
youtu.be/S1ee049xHmw.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Lusardi, 2015 WL 1607756, at *1.
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“intentionally and repeatedly . . . refer to [Tamara] by male names and
pronouns . . . well after he was aware that [Tamara’s] gender identity
was female.”7 In the 2015 interview, Tamara stated, “We’re sending a
clean [sic] message that says we want to be judged on how we do our
work and be our true selves . . . and not be judged on things that do not
affect our work performance. It allows me to do my job. It allows me to
be my true self.”8 In a different interview, Tamara shared, “As a disabled
veteran, I take great pride in my work making sure our soldiers are safe,
and I want to be able to focus on doing a good job without worrying
about harassment in the workplace . . . .”9
Tamara’s case depicts the type of harassment many transgender
people face at work. While Tamara was ultimately successful in her
harassment claim, the law in this area is largely unsettled; no federal
court of appeals has ever explicitly answered whether intentionally
calling someone by the wrong gender pronouns constitutes sexual
harassment under Title VII. For many years, it was unclear whether
transgender people were even protected under Title VII at all,10 but the
June 2020 Supreme Court decision, Bostock v. Clayton County, resolved
that question.11 In Bostock, the Court concluded that “[b]ecause
discrimination on the basis of . . . transgender status requires an
employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently
because of their sex, an employer who intentionally penalizes an
employee for being . . . transgender also violates Title VII.”12 In light of
the Bostock decision, this Comment will argue that refusal to use an
employee’s chosen13 name or pronoun and intentional misgendering
may constitute sexual harassment under Title VII. Such conduct creates
a hostile work environment by fostering sex stereotypes—that a person
must use the gender pronoun that conforms with the sex they were
assigned at birth—when misgendering rises to a sufficiently severe and
pervasive level as to alter the conditions of an individual’s employment.

Id. at *13.
American Federation of Government Employees, supra note 3.
9 Leada Gore, Transgender Army Civilian at Redstone Arsenal Awarded Settlement in
EEOC Discrimination Suit, AL.COM (Apr. 10, 2015, 9:35 PM), https://www.al.com/news/
huntsville/2015/04/transgender_army_civilian_at_r.html.
10 See Michael J. Vargas, Title VII and the Trans-Inclusive Paradigm, 32 LAW & INEQ.
169, 169–70 nn.3–4 (2014).
11 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
12 Id. at 1735. See infra Part II for a brief overview of Bostock.
13 This Comment uses the term “chosen” and not “preferred,” which people often use
in this context as the antithesis to a person’s legally documented or assumed name or
pronoun, to avoid implying that gender identity is merely a preference, and to recognize
that gender is usually deeply ingrained within a person’s sense of self.
7
8
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By way of background, gender identities come in many forms. A
person’s gender identity is their internal sense of their gender, which
may or may not align with the gender they were assigned at birth.14 The
adjective “cisgender” generally applies to individuals whose gender
identity corresponds with the sex they were assigned at birth.15 The
adjective “transgender” generally applies to individuals whose gender
identity is different from the sex they were assigned at birth.16 While
many transgender people may identify as men or women, others may
identify as nonbinary or gender nonconforming.17 The term “intersex”
applies to people who have a variety of physical sex traits, such as
variations in chromosomes or anatomy, “that do not conform with a
binary construction of sex as either male or female.”18 A person
possessing intersex characteristics need not identify as nonbinary;
being intersex does not determine a person’s gender identity.19
Moreover, there is no single way to define what it means to have a
nonbinary gender identity since identifying as nonbinary might mean
something different to different people.20 For instance, certain
individuals might identify with gender hybridity, “combining gender
roles into non-traditional configurations [such as] bigender, pangender,
and androgynous identities.”21 Others might reject gender altogether,
declining to conform with any “traditional gender categories,”
identifying as gender-neutral or unisex.22 Some might experience
gender as a dynamic notion and identify as “gender fluid.”23 Some
transgender and nonbinary people may experience gender dysphoria,
which is clinically described as a feeling of distress a person may
experience when their gender as assigned at birth does not align with
the gender with which they identify.24

14 Shirley Lin & Ezra Cukor, LGBTQIA+ Discrimination, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW & LITIGATION 2020 § 27:5 (2020).
15 Megan Brodie Maier, Altering Gender Markers on Government Identity Documents:
Unpredictable, Burdensome, And Oppressive, 23 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 203, 211 (2020).
16 Id.
17 Lin & Cukor, supra note 14, at 43.
18 Id. at 48; see also Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, And Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894,
898 (2019) (“While some nonbinary people have intersex variations, not all do, and
many people with intersex variations have male or female gender identities.”).
19 Lin & Cukor, supra note 14, at 48.
20 Clarke, supra note 18, at 905.
21 Clarke, supra note 18, at 906.
22 Id. at 906.
23 Id. at 906–07.
24 Glossary of Terms, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/glossaryof-terms (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
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While gender identity refers to someone’s internal sense of their
gender, gender expression refers to the ways in which a person presents
themselves through their appearance, such as through their clothing,
hair, name, pronouns, or other similar characteristics. Gender
expression “may or may not conform to socially defined behaviors and
characteristics typically associated with being either masculine or
feminine.”25 While a person’s gender identity and gender expression are
not necessarily the same, many people may express their gender
identity through their gender expression.26 Accordingly, with various
gender identities come various gender pronouns: most people who
identify as female use the pronouns she/her; most people who identify
as male use the pronouns he/him; people who identify as nonbinary or
gender nonconforming may use various pronouns, including they/them
or ze/zir.27
The population of transgender and gender nonconforming people
in the United States is significant and appears to be rising.28 According
to a 2016 study conducted by UCLA School of Law, approximately 1.4
million people identify as transgender in the United States, making up
about 0.6% of the population.29 The study also found that “younger
adults are more likely than older adults to identify as transgender.”30
According to a 2015 study conducted by the Pew Research Center, about
18% of adults in the United States say they personally know someone
who goes by gender-neutral pronouns,31 and according to the National
Center for Transgender Equality’s 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey,
approximately “35% of respondents indicated that their gender identity

Id.; Lin & Cukor, supra note 14, at 16 n.91.
Lin & Cukor, supra note 14, at 16 n.91.
27 Clarke, supra note 18, at 958. In addition, Dennis Baron, a professor of English
and linguistics at the University of Illinois, proposes a universal gender nonconforming
pronoun in the pronoun “they.” DENNIS BARON, WHAT’S YOUR PRONOUN? BEYOND HE AND SHE
149–83 (2020).
28 ANDREW R. FLORES ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS
TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 6 (2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/
publications/trans-adults-united-states (While the study shows the estimate of
transgender people in the U.S. doubled between a 2011 study and the 2016 study, “[a]
perceived increase in visibility and social acceptance of transgender people may
increase the number of individuals willing to identify as transgender on a governmentadministered survey.”).
29 Id. The study only accounted for people eighteen-years-old and older.
30 Id.
31 A.W. Geiger et al., About One-in-Five U.S. Adults Know Someone Who Goes by a
Gender-Neutral Pronoun, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2019/09/05/gender-neutral-pronouns.
25
26
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was best described as nonbinary.”32 Some states have taken various
actions to protect transgender and nonbinary individuals, including
recognizing a third gender category and passing legislation that permits
people to use “nonbinary” or “x” as a designation on certain
identification documents.33
Advocates have long asserted that discrimination based on gender
nonconformity, or discrimination “against men perceived as feminine or
women perceived as masculine,” remains “a harmful type of sex
discrimination that the law should redress.”34 Misgendering—referring
to someone as a gender different than the gender with which they
identify—would fall into this kind of discrimination. This is one
mechanism that advances the gender-based stereotype that individuals
should go by the names or pronouns that conform with the sex they
were assigned at birth.
Misgendering is a persistent issue that detrimentally affects many
transgender people in the workplace. The National Center for
Transgender Equality’s 2011 report on transgender discrimination
found that 45% of respondents reported having been misgendered
“repeatedly and on purpose” at work.35 The National Center for
Transgender Equality’s 2015 report stated that “[m]ore than threequarters (77%) of respondents” had taken “steps to avoid mistreatment
in the workplace, such as hiding or delaying their gender transition or
quitting their job.”36 Being misgendered is generally considered
psychologically harmful and can lead to feelings of negative affect, low
appearance state self-esteem, and stigmatization.37
32 SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S.
TRANSGENDER SURVEY 45 (2016) [hereinafter 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY], https://
www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS%20Full%20Report%20%20FINAL%201.6.17.pdf. The National Center for Transgender Equality’s 2015 survey
“is the largest survey examining the experiences of transgender people in the United
States.” Id. The organization planned to release an updated version of the survey in
2020, but the COVID-19 pandemic delayed its efforts. An updated version of the survey
is scheduled to be published in 2021.
33 Clarke, supra note 18, at 896–97.
34 Id. at 900.
35 JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 62 (2011), https://www.thetaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ntds_full.pdf.
36 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 32, at 148.
37 See Kevin A. McLemore, Experiences with Misgendering: Identity Misclassification
of Transgender Spectrum Individuals, 14 SELF AND IDENTITY 1 (2014); see also M. Paz
Galupo et al., “Every Time I Get Gendered Male, I Feel a Pain in My Chest”: Understanding
the Social Context for Gender Dysphoria, 5 STIGMA & HEALTH 199, 205 (2020) (concluding
that being misgendered can increase gender dysphoria, while recognizing “that not all
of the distress [caused by triggers such as being misgendered] originates from gender
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Many employers have already adopted internal policies to prohibit
employee misgendering.38 Additionally, some local jurisdictions have
recognized the importance of preventing misgendering and have
specifically enacted provisions to protect transgender people from
misgendering in the workplace. For example, Washington D.C. passed a
regulation stating that “[d]eliberately misusing an individual’s
preferred name[,] form of address or gender-related pronoun” may
qualify as “evidence of unlawful harassment and hostile environment”
when considering the totality of the circumstances.39
These
circumstances include “the nature, frequency, and severity of the
behavior” under an objective standard, “focusing on whether the
behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim’s employment[.]”40 Similarly, New York City’s Human Rights
Law “requires employers . . . to use the name, pronouns, and title (e.g.,
Ms./Mrs./Mx.) with which a person self-identifies, regardless of the
person’s sex assigned at birth, anatomy, gender, medical history,
appearance, or the sex indicated on the person’s identification.”41
Nevertheless, this Comment posits that employees across the country
should not have to rely only on employers’ internal policies or local laws
for redress, but should also have a federal remedy in Title VII for
intentional misgendering in the workplace.
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County. Part III will
discuss the development of gender discrimination, sex stereotyping, and
sexual harassment law under Title VII. Part IV will survey the EEOC’s
approach to Title VII hostile work environment claims based on
misgendering. Part V will discuss federal case law relevant to
misgendering. Part VI will analyze some challenges that may arise as
more employers and employees consider workplace pronoun policies to
comply with Title VII. Part VII will follow with a call to action for
employers and employees: for employers to adopt and enforce inclusive
pronoun practices, and for employees to make their pronoun details a
part of their work lives, if they wish.

incongruence per se, but may instead originate from stigma stress associated with
negotiating social interactions in a cisnormative context”).
38 Corporate Equality Index 2020, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/corporate-equality-index (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
39 D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 4, §808.2 (2020).
40 Id.
41 47 R.C.N.Y. § 8-102 (2019).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY
On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court held in its landmark decision,
Bostock v. Clayton County, that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s
prohibition against discrimination in employment “on the basis of . . .
sex” applies to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.42 The Court decided three cases in Bostock: two relating to
Title VII protection based on sexual orientation, and one relating to Title
VII protection based on gender identity.43 Bostock v. Clayton County and
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. posed similar issues; in both cases, the
plaintiffs’ employers fired them shortly after finding out the plaintiffs
were gay.44 In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, the plaintiff
was fired after informing her employer that she was transgender and
planning to transition from male to female.45
Ultimately, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Bostock majority, held
that “it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being . . .
transgender without discriminating against that individual based on
sex.”46 Despite the defendant-employers’ contention that in 1964, when
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, few would have expected Title VII
to reach issues of sexual orientation and gender identity, the majority
held that the statutory language plainly prohibits such discrimination.47
In the context of this Comment, it would follow that an employer who
intentionally treats an employee worse on the basis of sex—such as by
refusing to call a transgender employee by their chosen name and
pronoun while referring to cisgender employees by their chosen name
and pronouns without question—would also violate Title VII if the
conduct contaminates the conditions of the employee’s work.
The Court also stated that Title VII “makes each instance of
discriminating against an individual employee because of that
individual’s sex an independent violation of Title VII,” regardless of any
consideration of sex stereotyping. “So just as an employer who fires
both Hannah and Bob for failing to fulfill traditional sex stereotypes
doubles rather than eliminates Title VII liability, an employer who fires
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
Id. at 1737–38.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1738.
46 Id. at 1741.
47 Id. at 1749–51, 1754 (The majority posited that “because few in 1964 expected
today’s result, we should not dare to admit that it follows ineluctably from the statutory
text.” Moreover, the majority highlighted that it couldn’t have been the case that “no
one” would have expected Title VII to reach matters of gender identity in 1964, stating
that “[n]ot long after the law’s passage, . . . transgender employees began filing Title VII
complaints, so at least some people foresaw this potential application.”).
42
43
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both Hannah and Bob for being . . . transgender does the same.”48 This
statement implies that the sex stereotyping doctrine is still up for use
when considering discrimination against transgender people in the
workplace. In its decision, however, the majority also clarified that it
was not specifically addressing any other potentially adjacent Title VII
matters such as gender-based workplace dress codes or restroom
rules.49
Justice Alito, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority’s textual
analysis and lamented the decision’s inevitable implications, including
how the decision might change the way people use gender pronouns.50
Justice Alito posited that the majority’s decision might unduly change
how “employers address their employees” and how “teachers and
school officials address students.”51 Under traditional English, “two sets
of sex-specific singular personal pronouns are used to refer to someone
in the third person (he, him, and his for males; she, her, and hers for
females).”52 Justice Alito highlighted that “several different sets of
gender-neutral pronouns have now been created and are preferred by
some individuals who do not identify as falling into either of the two
traditional categories.”53
In any event, Bostock has been seen as a source of optimism for the
transgender community as it exemplifies a shift in the law that may
require increased protection for transgender people in various areas
even beyond the workplace, including housing, education, healthcare,
and credit.54
III. DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION, SEX STEREOTYPES, AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from
discriminating against “any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”55 Title VII does
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742–43 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1753.
50 Id. at 1755–56, 1782–83 (Alito, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 1782.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, The Landmark Bostock Decision: Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity Bias in Employment Constitute Sex Discrimination Under
Federal Law, COMPAR. LAB. L. AND POL’Y J., Aug. 2020, at 9; CHRISTY MALLORY, ET AL., LEGAL
PROTECTIONS FOR LGBT PEOPLE AFTER BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY (July 2020), https://
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/state-nd-laws-after-bostock/.
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2.
48
49
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not apply to all employers, but only those “engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who ha[ve] fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .”56 This Part
will discuss the development of sex stereotyping and sexual harassment
under Title VII, and how the Court came to embrace sex stereotyping as
a basis for finding hostile work environment sexual harassment.
A. Development of Sex Stereotyping Jurisprudence under Title VII
Before her time on the Supreme Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
successfully argued multiple cases asserting that “writing sex-based
stereotypes into the laws of the land was sex discrimination in violation
of equal protection[.]”57
In line with Justice Ginsburg’s early
construction of sex discrimination as based on stereotypes, the law
under Title VII developed to similarly recognize “a gender stereotyping
theory, under which workplace penalties and harassment of individuals
for failing to conform to gender stereotypes may be actionable sex
discrimination.”58
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court expanded Title
VII’s reach in a plurality decision, positing that taking adverse
employment action based on sex stereotypes was a prohibited form of
sex discrimination under Title VII.59 The Court found that the employer
violated Title VII when it relied on stereotypes about how women are
societally expected to present themselves in denying Hopkins (a
cisgender female manager) a partner position.60 Because the partners
reviewing her qualifications deemed she was not “feminine” enough, the
Court found the employer had discriminated against Hopkins by sex
stereotyping.61 Ultimately, because Hopkins’s gender was a motivating
factor to her employer’s decision to not promote her, the employer
violated Title VII.62 The Court noted that “[i]n forbidding employers to
42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family
Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1299 (2011).
58 Bornstein, supra note 57, at 1299.
59 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
60 Id. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
61 Id. One partner described Hopkins as too “macho,” and another recommended
that she should walk, talk, and dress more femininely, wear make-up, style her hair, and
wear jewelry to better suit herself for the role. Id.
62 Id. Relating to causation, the Hopkins plurality held that a plaintiff does not need
to prove that gender was the but-for cause of an adverse employment decision to
succeed on a Title VII claim, but just that gender was a motivating factor in taking the
adverse action. Id. at 250. The Title VII “motivating factor” causation standard was later
codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018) (“[A]n unlawful
56
57
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discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”63
B. Development of Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence Under Title
VII
Alongside the development of sex stereotyping jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court also began developing its sexual harassment law under
Title VII. Sexual harassment jurisprudence consists of two categories:
“quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” claims.64 Quid pro quo
sexual harassment occurs when an employer conditions employment
benefits on submission to “[unwelcome] sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”65
Hostile work environment harassment occurs when an employer
fosters or fails to prevent offensive behavior in the workplace, such as
“discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” that is so severe and
pervasive that it “alter[s] the conditions of [the victim’s] employment
and create[s] an abusive working environment.”66 Misgendering cases
would fall under the hostile work environment category.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court formally recognized
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination that violates Title VII,
holding that “a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving
that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment.”67 The Court elaborated that “[f]or sexual harassment to
be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors motivated the practice.”). Despite the hope that this
laxer causation standard would make Title VII claims easier for plaintiffs to win, the
motivating factor standard did not change much in the way of plaintiff success. See
Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why “Motivating Factor” Liability Did
Not Revolutionize Title VII, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 357 (2020). Additionally, the Bostock majority
applied “but for” causation in making its determination, suggesting that either standard
could apply. 140 S. Ct. at 1740, 1742.
63 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
64 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). But see Burlington Indus.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (noting that nothing in the statutory text expressly
separates sexual harassment claims into these two categories, and that the terms are
“helpful . . . in making a rough demarcation between cases . . . but beyond this are of
limited utility”).
65 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 § C.F.R. 1604.11(a)).
66 Id. at 65, 67.
67 Id. at 66.
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environment.’”68 Moreover, the Court asserted that Title VII’s
protection of the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” is not
limited to “economic” or “tangible” discrimination but to “the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment” in employment.69
In its unanimous decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the
Court elaborated on what it means for a workplace to be “hostile” and
further developed the “severe or pervasive” standard.70 In Harris, a
cisgender female manager was constantly subjected to negative genderbased comments, such as “[y]ou’re a woman, what do you know,” and
sexual innuendos by the president of the company.71 The Court granted
certiorari on Harris’s gender-based hostile work environment claim to
resolve a circuit split on whether an employer’s conduct “must
‘seriously affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being’ or lead the
plaintiff to ‘suffer injury’” to rise to the level of abusive work
environment harassment.72 The Court responded in the negative: to
violate Title VII, an employer needs only to act in a way that may “detract
from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from
remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.”73
The discriminatory conduct must be “severe or pervasive” and the work
environment must “reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive” under the totality of the circumstances.74 No one factor is
required, but a court may consider “the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.”75 While evidence of “[t]he
effect on an employee’s psychological well-being is relevant to

68 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). The
Meritor Court also cited Rogers v. EEOC as the first instance where a hostile work
environment claim was recognized, in holding that a workplace rampant with ethnic or
racial discrimination was so offensive as to “destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers . . . .” Id. at 66 (citing Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). Based on Rogers, the Meritor Court held that
“[n]othing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment based on discriminatory
sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
69 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
70 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
71 Id. at 19.
72 Id. at 22.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 22-23.
75 Id. at 23.
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determining whether the employee actually found the environment
abusive,” it is not required.76
Under this standard, a transgender individual facing severe or
pervasive intentional misgendering would not have to prove that their
workplace harmed their psychological well-being, or that they
experienced new or increased gender dysphoria. Although such a claim
would serve as evidence in support of the severe or pervasive nature of
the misgendering, the individual would need only to demonstrate that
the misgendering was reasonably perceived as abusive and “detract[ed]
from [their] job performance, discourage[ed] [them] from remaining on
the job, or [kept] them from advancing in their career[].”77 Severe and
pervasive misgendering can conceivably make someone want to quit
their job, not show up to work, or not want to work with a particular
person.
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., male supervisors
subjected the plaintiff, who was also male, to repeated physical
harassment.78 There, the Court held that “nothing in Title VII
necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ merely
because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same sex.”79 While
recognizing that “male-on-male sexual harassment” was not necessarily
one of Congress’s concerns when enacting Title VII, the Court wrote that
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils . . . .”80 The Court emphasized that the
severity of the conduct “should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position . . . .”81 In light of the Bostock
decision, this concept would transfer to misgendering cases. While
Congress was not expressly trying to rid the workplace of misgendering
when enacting Title VII, it is a reasonably comparable evil to other forms
of sex stereotyping that hold people back from participating and
advancing in the workplace.
Considering Bostock and the Supreme Court’s sexual harassment
precedent together, the thesis of this Comment—that intentional
misgendering may be grounds for a hostile work environment claim
because it may rise to a sufficiently severe and pervasive level as to alter
the conditions of an individual’s employment—fits within the sexual
harassment framework. Because Title VII protects transgender and
76
77
78
79
80
81

Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
Id. at 22.
523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id. at 81.
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gender-nonconforming people from disparate treatment in the
workplace, an employer cannot intentionally call an employee by the
wrong pronoun without violating Title VII in some respect. Such
misgendering is either discrimination per se or relies on the sex
stereotype that an employee’s pronouns should not deviate from
cisgender male and female expectations. This framework requires the
removal of the entire spectrum of disparate treatment between
employees of all gender identities, including practices that grant only
cisgender employees the protection of being called by their chosen
name and pronoun, at least when they are sufficiently severe or
pervasive to contaminate the work environment.
As to when an employer may be liable to a victim-employee for
hostile work environment sexual harassment, the Court held in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth that an employer may be vicariously
liable to an employee when a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment, even when the victim suffers no “tangible” employment
consequences, such as being fired or demoted.82 An employer may be
held liable if it intended the consequences of the supervisor’s
harassment, the employer was negligent or reckless in preventing the
harassment, the harassment occurred within the scope of a nondelegable duty of the employer, or the employee “purported to act or to
speak on behalf of the principal[.]”83 As a defense, an employer may
demonstrate that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.”84 An employer may also be held liable for hostile work
environment sexual harassment even when a nonsupervisory coworker or third party is the harasser; in this case, an employee would
have to prove that the employer was negligent in preventing the
harassment.85 Therefore, plaintiffs have the potential to bring hostile
524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998).
Id. at 758.
84 Id. at 765. Similarly, in Faragher v. Boca Raton, decided on the same day as
Burlington, the Court applied the same liability rule: “[A]n employer is vicariously liable
for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative
defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct as well as that of a
plaintiff victim.” 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). The Court held that the employer had failed
to take reasonable care to prevent the harassment, as the city did not keep track of
supervisors’ conduct, failed to disseminate its sexual harassment policy among its
employees, and did not have a reasonable complaint procedure in place for employees
to take advantage of. Id. at 808.
85 The Court further developed its Title VII vicarious liability framework in Vance v.
Ball State University, holding that an employer is not liable for the actions of supervisors
82
83
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work environment claims even when the employer did not intend to
cause a hostile work environment but fosters one as a consequence of
unchecked offensive workplace behavior.
The Burlington liability framework would not consider
misgendering a “tangible” employment action, like hiring or firing
would be. In a situation where a supervisor consistently calls an
employee by the incorrect pronoun, an employer would have to prove
that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly [the
misgendering], and . . . that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid [the misgendering] otherwise.”86
In a situation where a co-worker consistently calls an employee by
incorrect pronouns, an employer may be held liable for sexual
harassment if it was negligent in controlling the working conditions by
not taking action to prevent and correct the misgendering, or failed to
provide corrective opportunities.87 Examples of employers failing to
exercise reasonable care might include failing to provide training or
providing ineffective training regarding pronoun usage, failing to put in
place an adequate complaint system, or ignoring or dismissing
employee complaints of misgendering. Ultimately, if an employer knew
or should have known about the harassment—no matter if the harasser
is a supervisor, co-worker, or third party—and failed to take reasonable
care to stop the harassment, the employer may be liable to the victimemployee based on its negligence.88
Evidence of a supervisor’s or co-worker’s intentional misgendering
(as opposed to accidental misgendering) would make a “severe or
pervasive” argument significantly stronger. Under the severe and
pervasive framework—requiring that the harassment be so offensive as
to alter the conditions of the employee’s work—if a supervisor or coworker makes an honest mistake by calling an employee the wrong
pronoun, even if they are previously aware of their gender identity, their
conduct likely would not rise to a sufficiently severe or pervasive level

without the authority to make tangible employment decisions, such as hiring and firing,
because such an employee does not fit into the traditional definition of a supervisor. 570
U.S. 421, 424 (2013). But the Vance Court still makes clear that supervisors are not the
only ones who can cause harassment; an employer is liable under Title VII if it is
“negligent in failing to prevent harassment from taking place” and that “[e]vidence that
an employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to
provide a system for registering complaints, or effectively discouraged complaints from
being filed” are relevant considerations.” Id. at 448–49.
86 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.
87 Vance, 570 U.S. at 448–49.
88 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.
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to constitute harassment.89 And, arguably, if an employee never
explicitly shared their gender identity or pronouns, they likely would
not have taken the requisite preventative actions to avoid the hostile
treatment under the framework. This is because in many instances, “the
use of gendered language . . . relies on assumptions made based on
appearance.”90 The delicate fact of the matter in this instance is that a
person’s gender identity is not necessarily evident based on their
gender expression; this may apply whether the individual cares deeply
about whether others treat them in accordance with their gender
identity or the individual wishes to reject the concept of gender
altogether.
IV. EEOC GUIDANCE
The EEOC was established in 1964, as mandated by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, and was tasked with enforcing the provisions of Title
VII.91 The EEOC “is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it
illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of
the person’s race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, transgender
status, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older),
disability or genetic information.”92 The EEOC investigates charges of
discrimination, and if it determines that discrimination has occurred, it
will try to foster a settlement between the parties. It also has the
authority to file a lawsuit if the parties cannot agree on a settlement.93
While EEOC decisions are binding on federal agencies and departments,
89 Alternatively, there may be the potential for a disparate impact claim. While most
disparate impact claims “involve[] challenges to an employer’s qualification standards
or selection practices for hiring or promoting employees, rather than challenges to the
conditions of employment,” the amendment to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
“to include an express prohibition of ‘a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact’” leaves open the possibility for employees to make disparate impact
claims when their employer follows an employment practice that discriminatorily
affects the conditions of their work; “the phrase ‘employment practice’ is certainly broad
enough to include challenges to employment conditions[.]” Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual
Harassment and Disparate Impact: Should Non-Targeted Workplace Sexual Conduct Be
Actionable Under Title VII?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1152, 1190-91 (2002). Considering a
hypothetical workplace-discrimination policy that is silent on protecting transgender
employees or involves a custom of failing to correct employees who misgender coworkers or of ignoring misgendering complaints, there is the possibility of a successful
sexual harassment claim based on disparate impact, since cisgender employees would
be unlikely to face the same misgendering that a transgender employee might.
90 Chan Tov McNamarah, Misgendering as Misconduct, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 40,
52 (2020).
91 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–4.
92 Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/overview
(emphasis added).
93 Id.
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they are not binding upon the courts, although “[t]he administrative
interpretation of [Title VII] by the enforcing agency is entitled to great
deference.”94
The EEOC’s approach to misgendering claims under Title VII aligns
with the thesis of this Comment. An EEOC brochure released in 2014
asserted that “it is illegal for an employer to . . . permit harassment
because . . . [a]n employee is planning or has made a gender transition
from female to male or male to female.”95 And more recently, in
guidance released after the Bostock decision, the EEOC stated that
[I]f an employer fires an employee because that person was
identified as male at birth, but uses feminine pronouns and
identifies as a female, the employer is taking action against the
individual because of sex since the action would not have been
taken but for the fact the employee was originally identified as
male.96
In 2012, in Macy v. Holder, the EEOC held that transgender
discrimination constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII for the first
time.97 In 2013, in Jameson v. U.S. Postal Service, the EEOC reasoned that
“[i]ntentional misuse of [an] employee’s new name and pronoun may
cause harm to the employee, and may constitute sex-based
discrimination and/or harassment.”98 As discussed in the Introduction,
in 2015, the EEOC determined in Lusardi v. Dep’t of the Army that an
employee who is subject to intentional and repeated misgendering is
subject to hostile work environment sexual harassment.99

94 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971); see Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (While agency interpretations are not authoritatively
controlling upon the courts, they “do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts . . . may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment . . . will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and . . .
it[‘s] power to persuade . . . .”).
95 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PREVENTING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL OR TRANSGENDER WORKERS (BROCHURE) (April 29, 2014),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/preventing-employment-discriminationagainst-lesbian-gay-bisexual-or-transgender [hereinafter EEOC LGBTQ DISCRIMINATION
BROCHURE].
96 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY (SOGI)
DISCRIMINATION, https://www.eeoc.gov/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-sogidiscrimination (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
97 Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (E.E.O.C. April 20,
2012).
98 Jameson v. Donahoe, No. 0120130992, 2013 WL 2368729, at *2 (E.E.O.C. May 21,
2013).
99 Lusardi, 2015 WL 1607756, at *13.
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To provide more insight on Ms. Lusardi’s claims relating
specifically to the misgendering assertions, Lusardi asserted that her
supervisor repeatedly called her “by her former male name, by male
pronouns, and as ‘sir.’”100 In addition, Lusardi asserted that there were
at least seven instances where the supervisor did not correct himself
after misgendering her, and that there were at least four instances
where he did correct himself.101 The supervisor misgendered Lusardi in
front of her co-workers, during meetings, during heated arguments, and
via email.102 Lusardi confessed that she did not always correct the
supervisor because she thought she might suffer an adverse
employment action.103 The supervisor admitted to misgendering
Lusardi but alleged that these instances were just accidents and a “slip
of the tongue.”104 But Lusardi asserted that “there were occasions when
[the supervisor] intentionally used male pronouns . . . in order to elicit a
response from her[,]” such as during arguments.105 Moreover, during an
email conversation in which Lusardi expressed to the supervisor that
she believed “her team members did not treat her as an equal[]” and that
she believed the supervisor was “on the side of other employees who do
not treat her as an equal,” the supervisor responded, “Sir, not on
anyone’s side.”106 Witnesses testified that they observed the supervisor
misgendering Lusardi well after she notified her colleagues of her
transition, and that Lusardi shared with a co-worker that she felt “she
was working in a hostile or uncomfortable environment.”107
The EEOC maintains that an employer violates Title VII when
“intentionally and persistently failing to use the name and gender
pronoun corresponding to an employee’s gender identity as
communicated to management and employees[].”108 In Lusardi, the
EEOC contrasted the impact of accidental and intentional misgendering;
specifically, “inadvertent and isolated slips of the tongue likely would
not constitute harassment . . . .”109 In Ms. Lusardi’s case, it was found that
the use of incorrect pronouns “was not accidental, but instead was
intended to humiliate and ridicule [her].”110 Consequently, the
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at *3.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lusardi, 2015 WL 1607756, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
EEOC LGBTQ DISCRIMINATION BROCHURE, supra note 95.
Lusardi, 2015 WL 1607756, at *11.
Id.
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supervisor’s “repeated and intentional conduct was offensive and
demeaning . . . and would have been so to a reasonable person in [Ms.
Lusardi’s] position.”111 The EEOC also emphasized that “supervisory or
co-worker confusion or anxiety cannot justify discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.”112 This justifies the concept that employers
may be liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment even
when the hostile work environment was an unintentional consequence
of unchecked, offensive workplace behavior. This also justifies the
suggestion that employers must provide gender discrimination training
and foster inclusive workplace practices.113
V. FEDERAL CASE LAW DEMONSTRATES THAT TITLE VII PROHIBITS
INTENTIONAL MISGENDERING IN THE WORKPLACE
Federal courts have held that persistent sex stereotyping and
misgendering of cisgender employees constitutes sexual harassment
and, therefore, violates Title VII. Likewise, at least one federal district
court has held that intentional misgendering of transgender people also
constitutes sexual harassment under Title VII.
In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., a cisgender male
employee sued his former employer, alleging sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII.114 The employee asserted “that he was verbally
harassed by [his] male co-workers and a supervisor because he was
effeminate and did not meet their views of a male stereotype.”115 These
employees repeatedly called the plaintiff “she” and “her,” and degraded
him in both Spanish and English, calling him, among other things, a
“fucking female whore.”116 These affronts “occurred at least once a week
and often several times a day.”117 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that
the plaintiff-employee brought a successful hostile work environment
sexual harassment claim since he was persistently harassed, including
being misgendered, by co-workers for failing to conform to sex
stereotypes, and the employer failed to adequately deter future
harassment or correct the harassment.118 Post-Bostock, the same
reasoning as applied in Nichols would apply to a situation where a
transgender or nonbinary person is referred to by the incorrect
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id. at *9.
See infra Part VII.
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id. at 874–77.
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pronouns; if it is unreasonable and offensive to call a cisgender male by
the incorrect pronouns “she/her,” it would also be unreasonable and
offensive to call a transgender male by “she/her.” In both instances, the
victims fail to conform with traditional cisgender-based stereotypes of
how men and women should act.
There have been some relevant cases at the district court level, as
well. Milo v. CyberCore Techs., LLC was decided only months before the
Bostock decision. As such, the district court declined to hold whether
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on gender identity.119
Nevertheless, the district court found that the plaintiff, a transgender
woman, did not provide adequate evidence to prove the harassment she
faced was severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work
environment, despite multiple claims of misgendering and negative
comments about her female-expressive appearance.120 Specifically, the
plaintiff was subjected to intentional misgendering, negative comments
about her dresses and heels, and was told that “what [she thinks is
discriminatory] really doesn’t matter.”121 Of all these negative
comments, only one—a comment that the plaintiff’s skirt was too
short—was attributed to her direct supervisor, while the others were
made by various subcontractor employees at a company where she was
also working as a subcontractor.122
While the plaintiff-employee’s hostile workplace claim was
unsuccessful, it is arguable that she would have been successful under
different circumstances; the structure of the plaintiff’s work
environment—made up of mostly subcontractor co-workers from
various companies—was a barrier to her claim because almost all the
discriminatory conduct was by individuals not employed by the
plaintiff’s direct employer or subcontractor employer.123 Accordingly,
the court determined that neither the direct employer nor
subcontractor employer knew or should have known about the conduct
because the plaintiff did not take the requisite action to report the
conduct to either employer.124 Ultimately, there is a likelihood the case
could have turned out differently if the plaintiff had provided more
specific factual instances of misgendering, instead of merely stating that

119 Milo v. CyberCore Techs., LLC, No. SAG–18–3145, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5355, at
*10–11 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 2020).
120 Id. at *10–12.
121 Id. at *4–5.
122 Id. at *14.
123 Id. at *14–15.
124 Id. at *15.
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she was misgendered in general.125 The potential oversimplification of
many of the plaintiff’s allegations did not provide the court with enough
information to determine whether the misgendering was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to constitute hostile work environment sexual
harassment.126
Conversely, in Doe v. Triangle Doughnuts, LLC, the court cited to
Bostock, which had just been decided a month earlier.127 The plaintiff,
referred to as Jane Doe, was a transgender woman who identifies “by a
female name and female pronouns.”128 Doe worked at a Dunkin’ Donuts,
owned by the franchise company Triangle Doughnuts, LLC, for two
months.129 Within those two months, Doe alleged that she was subject
to “harassment and discrimination by coworkers and customers.”130
Specifically, Doe alleged that her “[supervisors and] coworkers
regularly misgendered [her] with a male name and male pronouns
despite her requests to use her female name and female pronouns.”131
Customers also misgendered Doe regularly, “sometimes [on a] daily
basis.”132 Doe’s supervisors prohibited her from using the women’s
restroom and subjected her “to a stricter dress code than other female
and cisgender employees.”133 Doe was also subjected to threatening
interactions with co-workers and customers; in one instance, a coworker threatened to beat her up, and in another, a group of customers
threatened to kill her.134 Instead of taking action to prevent these
misgendering and gender stereotyping affronts by co-workers or
customers, “Doe’s supervisors . . . reassigned her to duties that were out
of the view of customers.”135 In the end, Doe’s manager told her she
could go home if she did not feel safe but then fired her after Doe left
work for the day, later asserting that she was fired for violating the
company’s time off policy.136
The court provided the following hostile work environment
framework: the plaintiff must sufficiently plead that “1) the employee
suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her [gender], 2) the
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Milo, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5355, at *18.
Id. at *18–19.
Doe v. Triangle Doughnuts, LLC, 472 F. Supp. 3d 115, 129 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Triangle Doughnuts, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 122–23.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123–24.
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discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5)
the existence of respondeat superior liability.”137 A court must review
the claim under the totality of the circumstances, which may include
considering the factors set forth in Harris, including the “frequency of
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”138
Ultimately, the court found that Doe “adequately pleaded a hostile work
environment claim based upon gender stereotyping in violation of Title
VII,” highlighting the intentional misgendering as a major factor.139
The contrast between the extreme facts pled in Doe and the vaguer
allegations made in Milo exemplifies the high bar plaintiffs facing
misgendering harassment must hurdle to be successful in a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim. In any event, Doe v. Triangle
Doughnuts provides an illustration of how, in light of Bostock, Title VII
does provide an avenue for recourse in face of intentional misgendering
in the workplace.
In various contexts, courts have described misgendering as
damaging. Intentional misgendering has been described as a hostility,140
“objectively offensive,”141 “not a light matter [and] laden with
discriminatory intent,”142 “degrading, humiliating, invalidating, and
mentally devastating” to transgender individuals.143
Likewise,
misgendering can make a person feel “depressed [and] disrespected,”144
and “being referred to by the wrong gender pronoun is often incredibly
distressing”145 for a transgender person and can be “traumatic” to
someone with gender dysphoria.146 In the context of a student
137 Id. at 128 (quoting Henley v. Brandywine Hosp., LLC, No. CV-18-4520, 2019 WL
3326041, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2019)).
138 Triangle Doughnuts, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 128 (quoting Suri v. Foxx, 69 F. Supp. 3d
467, 480 (D.N.J. 2014)).
139 Id. at 129–30.
140 Tudor v. Se. Okla. State Univ., No. CIV-15–324-C, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177654, at
*4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 26, 2017).
141 Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31591, at *72 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015).
142 Doe v. City of N.Y., 42 Misc. 3d 502, 506–507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
143 Hampton v. Baldwin, No. 3:18-CV-550-NJR-RJD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190682, at
*7 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2018).
144 Id. at *47.
145 Prescott v. Rady Child.’s Hosp.-San Diego, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1096 (S.D. Cal.
2017).
146 Monroe v. Baldwin, 424 F. Supp. 3d 526, 545 (S.D. Ill. 2019).
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intentionally misgendering a teacher, misgendering was described as
“pure meanness.”147 None of the cases discussed in this Comment
provided instances where misgendering alone was the sole factor
causing a hostile work environment.
But if facing persistent
misgendering in the workplace can make an individual feel depressed,
disrespected, or humiliated, it follows that the misgendering could
significantly “alter the conditions of [that individual’s] employment and
create an abusive working environment” as set forth in the Supreme
Court’s hostile work environment jurisprudence.148
VI. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES
While individuals should be able to bring hostile work
environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII based on
misgendering, plaintiff-employees may confront certain defenses or
challenges. These defenses or challenges may include confronting
linguistic challenges for individuals who use gender-neutral pronouns,
such as “they/them/theirs,” which are increasingly, but still not
extensively, used; freedom of speech defenses by defendants who may
assert that workplace pronoun policies unconstitutionally forbid or
compel speech under the First Amendment; and religion-based defenses
by defendants who may assert that their religious beliefs bar them from
recognizing certain gender identities.
A. Language Challenges
As nonbinary gender identities have become more visible in
American and global culture, there has been a “growing acceptance of
gender-neutral pronouns, such as ‘they, them, and theirs.’”149 But in his
dissent in Bostock, Justice Alito lamented that the use of gender-neutral
pronouns will forcibly change the way people are required to address
each other, in a way that is inconsistent with “established English usage”
of pronouns.150 Justice Alito wrote that “two sets of sex-specific singular
personal pronouns are used to refer to someone in the third person (he,
him, and his for males; she, her, and hers for females).”151 He expressed
worry that “several different sets of gender-neutral pronouns have now

T.B. v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 897 F.3d 566, 577 (4th Cir. 2018).
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
149 Clarke, supra note 18, at 895.
150 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1782 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
151 Id.
147
148
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been created and are preferred by some individuals who do not identify
as falling into either of the two traditional categories.”152
But Justice Alito overlooked the notion that language can change
over time and is evolving to become more open to the use of genderneutral pronouns. As mentioned in the Introduction, about 18% of
adults in the United States say they personally know someone who goes
by gender-neutral pronouns.153 Approximately 29% of the 27,715
respondents to the 2015 National Center for Transgender Equality
survey reported using “they/their” as their pronouns.154 Additionally,
the American Psychological Association (APA) has officially embraced
“‘they’ as a singular third-person pronoun . . . .”155 Merriam Webster
declared “they” as its “Word of the Year” for 2019, noting that “they has
been used [as a gender-neutral pronoun] for over 600 years” and that
searches for the word on their website “increased by 313% in 2019.”156
The Associated Press Stylebook advises journalists to refer to “people
who identify as neither male nor female or ask not to be referred to as
he/she/him/her” to “[u]se the person’s name in place of a pronoun, or
otherwise reword the sentence, whenever possible. If they/them/their
use is essential, [a writer should] explain in the text that the person
prefers a gender-neutral pronoun.”157 The Chicago Manual of Style
states that while writers should be wary of using the word “they” in a
singular sense, the use of “they” as such has “become common in
informal usage . . . and [is] steadily gaining ground.”158 The Manual
continues that “[f]or references to a specific person, the choice of
pronoun may depend on the individual. Some people identify not with
a gender-specific pronoun but instead with the pronoun they and its
forms or some other gender-neutral singular pronoun; any such
preference should generally be respected.”159 In addition, the Manual

Id.
A.W. Geiger et al., supra note 31.
154 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY, supra note 32, at 4, 49.
155 Chelsea Lee, Welcome, Singular “They,” APA STYLE (Oct. 3, 2019), http://
apastyle.apa.org/blog/singular-they.
156 Merriam-Webster’s Words of the Year 2019, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/word-of-the-year-2019-they (last visited Oct. 8,
2021).
157 Travis M. Andrews, The Singular, Gender-Neutral ‘They’ Added to the Associated
Press Stylebook, WASH. POST, (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2017/03/28/the-singular-gender-neutral-they-added-to-theassociated-press-stylebook/.
158 CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE ¶ 5.256, at 360 (17th ed. 2017).
159 Id.
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provides various techniques for achieving gender neutrality in
writing.160
Moreover, the gender-neutral honorific “Mx.” has become more
widely used.161 On a similar note, the honorific Ms.—as opposed to
either Mrs. or Miss—which is now widely used, was at one point not
commonly used. It only reached mainstream usage in the 1970s after
feminist activists called for its adoption to deal with sex-biased
honorifics usage that focused only on a woman’s marital status.162
Oxford Languages contends that it “aims to describe, rather than
prescribe, the way languages are used by people around the world” and
“take[s] an evidence-based approach to language content creation,
looking at real examples of the ways words are used in context to
provide an accurate picture of a language.”163 Arguments that people
cannot be “forced” to use pronouns like they/them or ze/zir or
honorifics like Mx. because they are “made up,” will not have teeth once
they are widely used in regular society and recognized by well-regarded
research organizations.
B. Free Speech Challenges
On a similar note, some argue that workplace pronoun policies
unconstitutionally control speech under the First Amendment. In his
Bostock dissent, Justice Alito expresses concern that employers might
feel unduly pressured to suppress the speech of employees who may
disagree with a co-worker’s decision to use chosen pronouns.164 Law
professor Joshua Michael Blackman argues that requiring people to use
pronouns that align with a person’s gender identity “in effect impose
ideas about gender identity on speakers” and that “[r]equiring people to
voice beliefs that they do not hold, or even understand, is a flagrant and
unacceptable violation of the freedom of speech.”165
For example, in Meriwether v. Hartop, a university professor argued
that his employer violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech
when the employer disciplined him for refusing to call one of his

See CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE ¶ 5.255, at 359–60 (17th ed. 2017).
See Katy Steinmetz, This Gender-Neutral Word Could Replace ‘Mr.’ and ‘Ms.,’ TIME
(Nov. 10, 2015), https://time.com/4106718/what-mx-means/.
162 Ben Zimmer, Ms., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/
2009/10/25/magazine/25FOB-onlanguage-t.html?smid=tw-share.
163 How We Create Language Content, OXFORD LANGUAGES, https://languages.oup.com/
about-us/how-we-create-language-content (last visited Sept. 5, 2021).
164 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1783 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
165 See Josh Blackman, Opinion: The Government Can’t Make You Use ‘Zhir’ or ‘Ze’ in
Place of ‘She’ and ‘He,’ WASH. POST, (June 16, 2016), https://wapo.st/1tt4rWZ.
160
161
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students, a transgender woman, by female pronouns.166 The district
court held that the university did not retaliate against the professor in
violation of his freedom of speech, reasoning that the professor’s
statements misgendering the student did not constitute speaking on a
public concern.167 The court found that the statements were made in
the inconsequential context of an individual classroom and that his
“refusal to address a student in class in accordance with the student’s
gender identity [did] not implicate broader societal concerns” or
actually convey his beliefs about gender identity.168 In dismissing the
professor’s compelled speech claim, the district court reasoned that the
university did not compel the professor to say anything in particular, as
the professor was not forced to express a belief about gender identity
with which he did not agree; he could have decided to call the student
by her name or to stop using gender-based titles for the whole class.169
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the university did violate the
professor’s First Amendment right to free speech.170 The court first
emphasized the public university’s special place within First
Amendment jurisprudence, holding that public university professors
maintain free speech rights “at least when engaged in core academic
functions, such as teaching and scholarship.”171 Next, the court found
that the professor’s decision not to use the student’s chosen pronoun
did constitute speaking on a “matter of public concern” because his
“choices touch[ed] on gender identity—a hotly contested matter . . . that
‘often’ [came] up during class discussion in [his] political philosophy
courses.”172 The court stated that “titles and pronouns carry a
message.”173 In particular, the university wanted “its professors to use
pronouns to communicate [the] message [that] [p]eople can have a
gender identity inconsistent with their sex at birth. But [the professor
did] not agree with that message, and he [did] not want to communicate
it to his students.”174 Ultimately, the court decided that the professor’s
interest in refusing to use the student’s chosen pronoun, based on his

Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 501, 503 (6th Cir. 2021).
Meriwether v. Trs. of Shawnee State Univ., No. 18-CV-753, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151494, at *44, *49–50 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2019).
168 Id. at *49–50.
169 Id. at *53–54.
170 Hartop, 992 F.3d at 498.
171 Id. at 504–05.
172 Id. at 506.
173 Id. at 507.
174 Id.
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167

MENDES (DO NOT DELETE)

342

11/8/21 3:06 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:317

religious and philosophical beliefs, outweighed the university’s interest
in preventing discrimination against its transgender students.175
While the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in
Meriwether, neither court ruled out that there may be some middle
ground of pronoun policy that would have satisfied both courts’
standpoints, at least in the public university context. For instance, the
university’s policy did not actually require the plaintiff to use pronouns
at all, reasoning that professors have many different ways to address
students, such as by their names.176
C. Religious Freedom Challenges
Some have argued that religious affiliations should exempt certain
employers from complying with workplace pronoun rules.177 Justice
Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bostock implies that the case may have
been decided differently if a First Amendment free exercise or Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) argument had been presented:
“Because RFRA operates as a kind of super statute, displacing the
normal operation of other federal laws, it might supersede Title VII’s
commands in appropriate cases.”178 Justice Gorsuch did not touch
further on this topic, though, deciding that how questions of religious
liberty stand up against Title VII are “questions for future cases . . . .”179
Justice Gorsuch wrote that “while other employers in other cases may
raise free exercise arguments that merit careful consideration, none of
the employers before us today represent in this Court that compliance
with Title VII will infringe their own religious liberties in any way.”180
That was because Harris Funeral Homes did not pursue the RFRA
claim it had raised unsuccessfully in the Sixth Circuit.181 The Sixth
Circuit held that RFRA is not a valid excuse for employment
discrimination, citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and emphasizing the
Hobby Lobby majority’s signaling “that its decision should not be read as
providing a ‘shield’ to those who seek to ‘cloak[] as religious practice’

Id. at 509.
See Meriwether v. Trs. of Shawnee State Univ., No. 1:18-cv-753, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 151494 at *53–54.
177 See Paige Smith, Pronouns Spur Fight Over Transgender, Religious Work Rights,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 18, 2020, 6:16 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/pronouns-prompt-fight-over-transgender-religious-rights-at-work.
178 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
175
176
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their efforts to engage in ‘discrimination in hiring . . . .’”182 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that because Title VII aims to safeguard “‘an equal
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to’ . . . an
array of . . . protected traits,” any Title VII enforcement action “will
necessarily defeat RFRA defenses to discrimination made illegal by Title
VII.”183 Applying the Sixth Circuit’s rationale to a misgendering claim, it
would follow that RFRA is not a valid excuse for employers with
religious affiliations to allow intentional misgendering, as misgendering
that rises to a severe and pervasive level impedes transgender and
nonbinary employees from an equal opportunity to participate in the
workforce without regard to their gender identity.
VII. A RECOMMENDATION ON HOW EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS SHOULD MOVE
FORWARD
Appreciating that receiving respect and dignity in the workplace is
essential to employees’ wellbeing and that prophylactic compliance
with Title VII is important for employers to maintain a happy and strong
workforce, this Comment ends with a call to both employers and
employees to adopt proactive gender-inclusive pronoun practices.
Employers should create opportunities for new employees to share
their pronouns if they wish, such as inquiring through the onboarding
process, encouraging employees to include their pronouns in their email
signature lines, and encouraging employees to share their pronouns
during introductory meetings.184 Providing such opportunities takes
the onus off an employee—who might be anxious about being
misgendered at work, but might not know how to approach sharing
their pronouns—from having to announce their pronouns with each
new interaction.185 An employer can encourage employees to share
EEOC v. R.G., 884 F.3d 560, 595 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 686 (2014)).
183 Id. at 595.
184 See Talking About Pronouns in the Workplace, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND.,
https://hrc-prod-requests.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/files/assets/resources/
TalkingAboutPronouns_onesheet_FINAL.pdf?mtime=20200713142932&focal=none
(last visited Sept. 5, 2021) (discussing ways to create opportunities for pronoun sharing
in the workplace); see also The Survey is In: Gen Z Demands Diversity and Inclusion
Strategy, TALLO (Oct. 21, 2020) https://tallo.com/blog/genz-demands-diversityinclusion-strategy/. Through a survey on Generation Z’s perspectives on companies’
diversity and inclusion practices, the networking platform Tallo found that 88% of
respondents agree that it is “important that recruiters or potential employers ask people
about their preferred gender pronouns,” and 65% of respondents “strongly agree with
that statement.” Id.
185 Julia Carpenter, What It’s Like to Be Labeled the Wrong Gender at Work, CNN BUS.
(Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/09/success/lgbtq-misgendering-workplace/index.html.
182
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their pronouns, but it should not be mandatory.186 If shared, employers
may wish to maintain records of employees’ names and pronouns to
“ensure that whenever possible, appropriate terms will be used for
personnel and administrative purposes, such as directories, email
addresses, and business cards.”187 Additionally, employers should
deliver diversity and inclusion training to all employees and include
language in their employee handbooks to ensure “that proper pronoun
usage is part of creating an environment in which all employees feel
valued and respected.”188 Moreover, employers should establish a
sound process where employees can come forward in the event they are
being misgendered; employers should recall that “the mere existence of
a grievance procedure” and an inclusive pronoun policy, “coupled with
[a victim’s] failure to invoke that procedure, [does not] insulate [an
employer] from liability.”189 These procedures must be reasonably
designed “to encourage victims of [misgendering] to come forward.”190
Taking such proactive measures to prevent supervisory and
nonsupervisory employees from misgendering another employee is
required under Title VII’s Burlington/Faragher/Vance liability standard
framework.191
In relation to employees and supervisors who might think their
gender identity is “obvious” from their gender expression or their use of
a traditionally gendered name, it still may be beneficial for them to
introduce themselves with their pronouns or include them in their email
signature to help normalize using pronouns and foster a more inclusive
workplace. Employees should remember that while misgendering
should always be avoided, honest mistakes are bound to happen; the
best practice is to “apologize, move on, and make sure to get it right the
next time.”192
If an employee thinks it would help in preventing misgendering,
and if they feel comfortable, the employee should share their pronouns
upon meeting new people and include their pronouns in their email
signature line or video conferencing platform; employees should be
186 Tat Bellamy Walker, How to Support Nonbinary and Trans Colleagues at Work, and
the Email Template to Use If You Accidentally Misgender Them, BUS. INSIDER (June 10,
2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-support-trans-nonbinary-coworkers-misgendering-at-work.
187 Christian N. Thoroughgood et al., Creating a Trans-Inclusive Workplace, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Mar. 1, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/creating-a-trans-inclusive-workplace.
188 Id.
189 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
190 Id. at 73.
191 See supra Part III.
192 Thoroughgood, supra note 187.
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aware that to succeed in a Title VII claim based on misgendering, they
may need to demonstrate that they took some level of preventative
action to avoid misgendering under Title VII’s liability framework.193 In
addition, while likely challenging and emotionally exhausting,194 an
employee who has been misgendered should correct supervisors and
co-workers if they use the incorrect pronouns, as the
Burlington/Faragher/Vance framework looks to see that employees
have taken corrective action to avoid harm.195 If necessary, employees
should report misgendering to someone within the chain of command,
or if available, follow any corrective action procedures provided by the
employer, as again, employees are generally required to seek corrective
opportunities to avoid misgendering to be successful in a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim.196 If the employer’s preventative
or corrective measures are not effective and the misgendering becomes
severe or pervasive, employees seeking redress based on misgendering
in the workplace may, along with considering state and local remedies,
look to the Bostock decision and sex stereotyping precedents in making
a hostile work environment claim under Title VII.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County made
clear that employees of various gender identities are protected from
harassment under Title VII.
Employees who face pervasive
misgendering in the workplace now have a stronger avenue to redress
via the Bostock decision’s strong textualist holding, in combination with
the Court’s longstanding sex stereotyping doctrine. This proposition is
further supported by the EEOC’s explicit guidance that intentional
misgendering constitutes sexual harassment under Title VII.
Additionally, federal courts have recognized that misgendering may rise
to a sufficiently severe and pervasive level to create a hostile work
environment, and that misgendering is offensive, disrespectful, and
degrading in various contexts. Ultimately, employers should be on
notice that intentional misgendering, as well as failure to prevent such
mistreatment, may constitute hostile work environment sexual
harassment, as it advances the archaic stereotype that a person must

See supra Part III.
Mary Retta, Work Sucks, Especially When People Get Your Pronouns Wrong, VICE
(June 21, 2019) https://www.vice.com/en/article/kzmy39/pronouns-at-work-transnonbinary.
195 See supra Part III.
196 See supra Part III.
193
194
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use the gender pronouns that conform with the sex they were assigned
at birth.

